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 One Size Does Not Fit All: A Look at the 
Disproportionate Effects Of Federal Mandatory 
Minimum Drug Sentences On Racial Minorities 
And How They Have Contributed To The 
Degradation Of The Underprivileged African–
American Family 
 
By: Danielle Snyder1 
 
I. Welcome to the Federal Slaughterhouse—Bang, Bang, 
Next! 
 
“If you stand in a Federal Court, you’re watching poor and 
uneducated people being fed into a machine like meat to make 
sausage.  It’s just bang, bang, bang, bang, next!” says journalist 
Charles Bowden in Eugene Jarecki’s documentary film entitled, The 
House I Live In.2 This metaphorical butchery concept illustrates the 
harsh and unfair nature of mandatory minimum sentencing laws.3  In 
                                                 
1 J.D. candidate at the St. Thomas University School of Law in Miami Gardens, 
Florida, May 2015. 
2 THE HOUSE I LIVE IN (British Broadcast Corporation Oct. 5, 2012) (documenting 
the social and political history of the war on drugs and its effects on culture and 
society, specifically highlighting the disproportionate effects on the African–
American community and impoverished persons).  The documentary’s main focus 
concentrates on the racial inequities of the legal system in the war on drugs, and 
exposes the war efforts as de facto racist in its commencement, as well as in its 
continuation.  Id.  The documentary also includes thorough research and 
testimonials from experts such as; Harvard University professors, a doctor 
specializing in addiction, a federal judge, a senator, a criminal defense attorney, 
narcotics officers, authors, reporters, historians, and more.  Id. 
3 Safety Valves in a Nutshell, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS 1 (Jul. 
16, 2009), 
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Safety_valves_in_a_nutshell_7.16.09%5
B1%5D.pdf [hereinafter SAFETY VALVE NUTSHELL] (“A mandatory minimum is a 
sentence, created by Congress or a state legislature, which the court must give to a 
person convicted of a crime, no matter what the unique circumstances of the 
offender or the offense are.”); Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 
1970 Repeal of Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 55, 56 (2008) 
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the American criminal justice system, almost every drug offender is 
thrown into a mandatory sentencing scheme, stuffed into a particular 
classification, and then shipped off to federal prison without any 
further consideration of that individual’s unique facts or 
circumstances.4  Mandatory minimums treat the individual like an 
interchangeable piece of homogenous sausage; the hard–working 
family man with an unfortunate vice,5 the desperate mother trying to 
                                                 
(defining a mandatory minimum sentence as a “required minimum term of 
punishment (typically incarceration), that is established by Congress or a state 
legislature in a statue”).  When mandatory minimums are applied, they force judges 
to follow the corresponding statute, “regardless of unique facts and circumstances 
of the defendant or the offense.”  Gill, supra. 
4 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
5 Stories: Michael McClain, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
http://famm.org/michael-mcclain/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  Michael had a history 
of untreated depression and alcoholism, which paved the way for his later formed 
cocaine addiction.   When Michael had his first son he took on longer hours at work 
and traveled more in an effort to support his family.   Unfortunately, this scheduled 
proved to be too taxing for Michael, and so he experimented with cocaine hoping 
that it would provide him with enough energy to keep up.   As a result, he was fired 
from his job, his marriage ended, and he lost custody of his son.  Michael then 
enrolled in drug treatment and kicked his cocaine habit, which allowed him to get 
a new job, regain sole custody of his son, and purchase his first home.  Sadly, 
Michael once more turned to drugs to help him perform better on the job and keep 
up with his new life, this time trying methamphetamine.  The methamphetamine 
took control of Michael’s life, he lost his son, his job, his home, and thus began to 
sell marijuana and methamphetamine in order to support his addiction.  Michael 
was sentenced to fifteen years total, ten years for the drug trafficking charges, and 
an additional five year enhancement for his possession of a firearm.  Id. 
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stay afloat,6 the susceptible teenager who played a nominal role,7 and 
the chronic and malicious offender are all one–and–the–same.8  By 
lumping all drug offenders together as criminals to be locked up and 
                                                 
6 Stories: Sharanda Jones, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
http://famm.org/sharanda-jones/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).  Sharanda, a first–
time, non–violent drug offender, was sentenced to life in federal prison without 
parole.  Sharanda maintained steady employment as a hair stylist and restaurant 
manager, however she constantly struggled to get by and had financial difficulties 
trying to support herself and her eight–year–old daughter.  Out of desperation and 
the desire to form a better life for her family, Sharanda made a poor decision to 
become involved in a cocaine and crack cocaine distribution rink.  Sharanda’s role 
was  to buy cocaine from a supplier in Houston, Texas and bringing it back to 
Dallas, Texas. At trial, Sharanda was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.  Although she only transported 
the powder form of cocaine, the court sentenced her under the harsher crack 
cocaine penalties because she knew, or should have known, that the powder she 
was bringing back was being transformed into crack cocaine.  Sharanda also 
received enhancements because she was considered a “leader,” and because she 
possessed a firearm, even though she legally purchased the firearm for her 
protection.  At the time of Sharanda’s arrest, she only had $250 in her bank account.  
Id. 
7 Stories: Ronald J. Evans, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
http://famm.org/ronald-j-evans/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  Ronald’s story is a 
sadly commonplace theme for young and impressionable adolescents growing up 
in inner city projects, surrounded by hardships and the lure of easy money.   Ronald 
was raised by a single mother in a public housing project.   He suffered from 
learning disabilities which caused him to struggle in school, and lead to his 
reaching out to and associating with the neighborhood drug dealers.  By Ronald’s 
sixteenth birthday he got involved in the drug business, first as a lookout making 
fifty dollars a day, second as a small quantity heroin seller, and then later 
progressing to couriering money, and packaging and transporting drugs.   At 19–
years–old, Ronald was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
Id. 
8 Stories: Debi Campbell: Success Story, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS, http://famm.org/debi-campbell/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  Debie 
spent more than sixteen years in federal prison for a non–violent drug offense.  She 
unfortunately became addicted to methamphetamine and started to sell it in to 
others in order to support her habit and family at the same time. Debie was 
sentenced to more time than some convicted murderers or kidnappers receive.  Id. 
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uniformly9 punished according to some arbitrary weight–based 
sentencing criteria,10 Congress has created an unjust11 system that 
fails to take the “whole person into account.”12 
Additionally, the punitive objective13 of mandatory minimum 
drug sentencing laws criminalizes all drug users by attempting to deal 
                                                 
9 See Gill, supra note 3, at 61 (referring to the uniformity of mandatory minimum 
sentences as “one–size–fits–all”);  What are Mandatory Minimums, FAMILIES 
AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://famm.org/mandatory-
sentencing/mandatory-minimums/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter FAMM 
What are Mandatory Minimums] (stating that mandatory minimums are 
“inflexible, ‘one–size–fits–all’ sentencing laws [that] may seem like a quick–fix 
solution for crime . . . [however,] they undermine justice by preventing judges from 
fitting the punishment to the individual and the circumstances of their offenses.”). 
10 See discussion infra Part II A–B (discussing mandatory minimum laws and the 
arbitrary provisions set forth in the 1986 ADAA and 1988 Omnibus Act). 
11 But see STEPHEN MURDOCH, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, THE DEBATE 
OVER MANDATORY MINIMUMS (2001), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/nov
ember_2001/minimums.cfm (referring to statements made by William Otis, an 
assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia from 1981 to 1999, who 
also served on the attorney general’s Advisory Subcommittee on Sentencing).  Otis 
advocates that instead of “handicap[ping] the pursuit of justice,” mandatory 
minimums have actually “increased fairness by imposing a degree of uniformity 
on the criminal justice system.”  Id. 
12 Cracked Justice—Addressing The Unfairness In Cocaine Sentencing: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 110th 
Cong.1, Sess. 67 (2008) (testimony of Michael Short, Former Offender, Md.) 
[hereinafter Cracked Justice] Stating that: 
Mandatory minimums forbid a judge from taking the whole person into account. 
Remorse, acceptance of responsibility, the influence of coercion or poverty, 
addiction—all of it gets swept aside in favor of one measure, the weight of drugs.  
It makes the small fry as liable to serve extremely hard sentences as those who 
actually deserve them. 
Id. 
13 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2010); Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Provisions Under Federal Law, CATO INSTITUTE 1 (May 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/mandatory-minimum-
sentencing-provisions-under-federal-law (stating that mandatory minimums don’t 
serve traditional or consequentialist goals of punishment); Barbara S. Vincent & 
Paul J. Hofer, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A 
SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 11 (1994), available at 
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with a health problem as if it were a legal problem, thus contributing 
to the drug abuse problem and America’s futile efforts in its war 
against drugs.14  While it is certainly true that drugs in–and–of 
                                                 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/conmanmin.pdf/$file/conmanmin.pdf 
(stating that mandatory minimum sentences have been ineffective in producing 
congressional goals of reducing crime or drug availability).  Mandatory minimum 
sentences don’t serve traditional goals of punishment, because they undermine a 
common principle of justice, “[t]he notion of proportionality between crime and 
punishment,”—essentially that the punishment should fit the crime.  Luna, supra.  
The author clarifies that because mandatory minimums eliminate a judge’s 
discretion to impose a sentence lower than the statute mandates, it makes the 
particular facts of a defendant’s case irrelevant, and thus makes mandatory 
minimums indifferent to any concept of proportionality.  Consequentialist goals 
are also unaccomplished by mandatory minimum sentences, because they fail “to 
provide effective, efficient deterrence or meaningful incapacitation.”  The author 
stipulates that “[c]larity and certainty of punishment are not synonymous with 
deterrence,” and equates an economic cost–benefit analysis to a criminal cost–
benefit analysis.  The cost–benefit analysis requires that a defendant not only know 
the rule, but also believe that the costs outweigh the benefits from violating the 
law, and then apply that understanding to decision–making at the time of the crime.  
Id.  Furthermore, the statute provides that there are four purposes of sentencing, to: 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 
and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . . 
§ 3553(a)(2). 
14 See THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2 (interviewing Dr. Gabor Maté, a 
physician, and an expert on addictions); Dr. Gabor Maté, Stop Treating Drug Users 
As Criminals, (Jul. 27, 2013, 3:02 PM), available at 
http://drgabormate.com/article/stop-treating-drug-users-as-criminals/ (discussing 
the failure of the drug war and attributing it to a lack of social and scientific 
understanding concerning drugs and drug use).  Dr. Maté recognizes drug abuse as 
a matter of public health and explains that treating drug use as only a legal issue 
has contributed to the drug problem in America.  THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra.  In 
his article, Dr. Maté explains that: 
This war has failed to curtail drug use, trafficking or the spread of addiction . . . 
The war is doomed to fail because neither the methods of war nor the war metaphor 
itself are appropriate to a complex social problem that calls for compassion, self–
searching insight, and  factually researched scientific understanding. 
Mate, supra.. 
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themselves destroy lives, it is also inherently true that American anti–
drug policies impose significant costs, burdens, and aggregate harm 
on society.15  Although incarceration is an important function of the 
criminal justice system, prison should not be the only mechanism for 
dealing with an individual who has committed a low–level,16 non–
violent drug offense.17  Research has indicated that alternatives to 
incarceration (such as supervised probation through drug courts,18 
work programs, and treatment programs) reduce criminal 
reoffending and significantly lower costs to American taxpayers.19 
                                                 
15 Christopher Mascharka, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: 
Exemplifying the Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 
965 (2001) (noting that both drugs and anti–drug policies may impose costs and 
aggregate harm on society). 
16 Jamie Fellner, Drug Laws: Policy and Reform: Race, Drugs, and Law 
Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 269 (2009) 
(describing low–level drug offenders as “bit players” mostly consisting of street–
level dealers, couriers, or lookouts);, Decades of Disparity: Drug Arrests and Race 
in the United States  (2009), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf [hereinafter 
HRW Decades of Disparity] (stating that from 1999 through 2007, eighty percent 
or more of all drug arrests were for simple possession, a low–level offense). 
17 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2010);, Fact Sheet: Drug Related Crime, , U.S. DEPT’ OF 
JUSTICE 1 (Sept., 1994), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/DRRC.PDF [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
Fact Sheet] (defining drug offenses, as violations of laws prohibiting or regulating 
the possession, use, distribution, or manufacture of illegal drugs). The federal 
statute defines unlawful acts that constitute drug offenses, and states that: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance; or to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance. 
§ 841(a)(1)(2). 
18 Drug Courts Work, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/facts-and-figures (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) 
[hereinafter Drug Court Facts] (finding that drug courts reduce crime, save money, 
ensure compliance, combat addiction, and restore families). 
19 See Congressman John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. 
& POL'Y REV. 377, 385 (2013) (stating that “[l]aws that provide for alternatives to 
prison for low–level offenses, such as possession or use of drugs, would reduce 
recidivism, lower incarceration rates, diminish the severity of the criminal justice 
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For the past forty years,20 the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentences and their draconian effects, have fueled the 
unsuccessful21 “crusade for a drug–free America,”22 and have lead to 
                                                 
system, and reduce the number of guilty pleas motivated by the possibility of a 
long mandatory minimum sentence.”).  But see Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less 
Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & 
ECON. 551 (2009) (suggesting that sentence enhancement policies, such as 
mandatory minimum sentences, “reduce crime by deterring potential offenders 
from committing crimes and by preventing convicted offenders from reoffending 
through lengthened incapacitation.”). 
20 David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 241, 252 (2001) (“By all accounts, the war on drugs has been a failure.  
Although nearly half a million people are locked up for drug crimes, drugs are 
cheaper, purer, and more easily available than ever before.”); THE HOUSE I LIVE 
IN, supra note 2 (“For the past forty years, the war on drugs has resulted in more 
than forty–five million arrests, one trillion dollars in government spending, and 
America’s role as the world’s largest jailer. Yet for all that, drugs are cheaper, 
purer, and more available than ever.”). 
21 See Frank O. Bowman III, The Geology of Drug Policy, 14 FED. SENT'G REP. 
123, 123 (2002) (“The notion that ‘the drug war is a failure’ has become the 
common wisdom in academic . . . circles”); James A. Inciardi, Policy Issues in the 
Sentencing of Drug Offenders, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 397, 397 (2004) 
(describing the general consensus among those who have closely studied the war 
on drugs as being “ineffective”); Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of 
Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 
65, 65 (2009) (stating that “[e]xperienced practitioners, policy analysts, and 
researchers have long agreed that mandatory penalties in all their forms . . . are a 
bad idea.”).  But see Maya Rhodan, Obama Expands Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing Relief, SWAMPLAND TIME (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://swampland.time.com/2013/09/20/obama-expands-mandatory-minimum-
sentencing-relief/ (explaining that there are still policymakers and prosecutors who 
support mandatory minimum sentences, and who believe that mandatory 
minimums are essential to the war on crime).  Inciardi states in his article that: 
The general consensus of advocates for drug policy change has been that the ‘war 
on drugs’ is ineffective, having accomplished little more than incarcerating 
hundreds of thousands of individuals whose only crime was the possession of 
drugs, and in so doing, disenfranchising them in the areas of voting, employment 
opportunities, and housing . . . . 
Inciardi, supra. 
22 Chris Reidy, Reagans’ Crusade: ‘Drug–free America,’ ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
(Sept. 15, 1986), available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1986-09-
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America being the largest jailer.23  Moreover, in addition to being 
both ineffective and economically unsustainable,24 mandatory 
                                                 
15/news/0250330102_1_drug-abuse-drug-problem-drug-free (reporting on 
President Ronald Reagan’s televised speech, wherein he unveiled his new plans to 
win the war and achieve a drug–free America).  See generally MICHAEL TONRY, 
PUNISHMENT AND POLITICS 54 (2004) (explaining that although the political 
frameworks surrounding the drug war campaigns appeared to target drug use and 
crime, the underlying implications carried racial undertones); Michelle Alexander, 
The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 15 (2011) (suggesting that the initial 
campaign against the war on drugs was all political); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, 
Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the ‘War on Drugs' was a 
‘War on Blacks,’ 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 389 (2002) (showing a decline 
in recreational drug use when Reagan launched his initial campaign against drugs).  
President Reagan’s anti–drug crusade vilified drug abuse by labeling it as an 
“epidemic,” a “menace” to society, and “a repudiation of everything America is.”  
Reidy, supra.  Reagan accused drugs of undercutting America’s institutions, 
threatening societal values, and killing America’s children.  Id.  Reagan even went 
as far as to compare the anti–drug crusade to World War II, by calling the crusade 
“another war for our freedom.”  Id.  In 1982 however, during President Reagan’s 
initial campaign against the drug war, statistics displayed a decline in recreational 
drug use, not an increase.  Nunn, supra.  Therefore, from the onset, the declaration 
against the war on drugs had “little to do with drug crime” or drug statistics and 
“much to do with racial politics” and political campaigning.  Alexander, supra.  
Although political frameworks surrounding presidential campaigns seemed to be 
concerted in targeting the drug war for the sake of societal welfare and abrogating 
crime, the underlying implications carried racial undertones.  TONRY, supra.  
Essentially, “welfare fraud and violent crime were given black faces.”  Id. 
23 Conyers, supra note 19, at 377 (stating that the United States now has the 
highest incarceration rate in the world). 
24 See Seth Ferranti, 24–Year–Old Gets 3 Life Terms in Prison for Witnessing a 
Drug Deal: The Ugly Truth of Mandatory Drug Sentencing, ALTERNET.ORG, (Jun. 
11, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/story/155794/24-year-
old_gets_3_life_terms_in_prison_for_witnessing_a_drug_deal%3A_the_ugly_tru
th_of_mandatory_drug_sentencing (noting that incarcerating low–level, non–
violent drug offenders is senseless and economically wasteful); Nicole Flatlow, 
U.S. Attorney General To Ease Impact Of Harsh Drug Sentencing Laws, 
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Aug. 12, 2013, 8:48 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/12/2444441/holder-sentencing-and-
drugs/http:/thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/12/2444441/holder-sentencing-and-
drugs/ (quoting U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, “widespread incarceration at 
the federal  . . . level . . . is both ineffective and unsustainable . . . [i]t imposes a 
significant economic burden—totaling $80 billion in 2010 alone—and it comes 
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minimum drug sentences have produced remarkably disparate effects 
in poor minority communities,25 specifically impacting 
underprivileged African–Americans and their families.26 
This comment intends to show how mandatory minimum 
drug sentencing laws systematically and disproportionately impose 
severe social and economic ramifications upon the underprivileged 
African–American community.27  Additionally, this comment will 
demonstrate that because of the adverse and disparate impact, 
mandatory drug minimums have inadvertently lead to a degradation 
of the African–American family.  Part II offers a historical 
perspective of the “War on Drugs” and the re–emergence of 
mandatory minimum drug laws,28 provides background information 
on the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine,29 and introduces the only two exceptions to the mandatory 
drug provisions.30  Part III discuses how mandatory minimum 
                                                 
with human and moral costs that are impossible to calculate.”).  See generally 
Stories: Sharanda Jones, supra note 6 (explaining that taxpayers are spending over 
$1.2 million dollars incarcerating Sharanda Jones for life, a first–time, non–violent 
drug offender).  The American legal system is the only system in the world that 
imposes life sentences to teenagers for small–time, non–violent drug offenses, and 
spends about $40 billion dollars a year locking up thousands of low–level 
offenders.  Ferranti, supra. 
25 Disparate Impact of Federal Mandatory Minimums on Minority Communities 
in the United States, Families Against Mandatory Minimums 2 (Mar. 10, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/38367_file_IAHRC_statement_
FNLNWQC__2__fnl.pdf [hereinafter DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES] (“Mandatory minimums systematically and disproportionately 
affect minority groups in this country.”). 
26 id. at 4 (“The mandatory minimum sentencing structures contribute to striking 
disparity and harsh results for defendants of color”).  Research also indicates that 
African–Americans are negatively impacted by mandatory minimum provisions 
simply because of certain policies and procedures.  Id. at 2. 
27 id. (reporting on research that indicates mandatory minimum laws 
disproportionately impact minority groups, specifically African–American and 
Latino communities). 
28 See discussion infra Part II. A. 
29 See discussion infra Part II. B. 
30 See discussion infra Part II. C. 
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sentencing laws unintentionally result in racially discriminatory 
policies and operational practices that disproportionately impact the 
African–American community.31  Part IV examines the harmful and 
indirect consequences mandatory minimum drug sentences impose 
on African–American families.32  Part V offers solutions that 
endeavor to eradicate the adverse effects mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws have on the African–American community,33 and 
finally, Part VI briefly concludes this comment.34 
 
II. Historical Context and Background 
 
To fully comprehend the War on Drugs and the passing of 
mandatory minimum draconian punishments, it is important to 
understand the historical criminalization of certain kinds of drugs 
that are illicit today, and to recognize the fact that the Nation’s anti–
drug laws have always historically been associated with race.35  In 
the 1800’s, drugs such as opium, cocaine, heroine, and cannabis were 
lawful and common in the United States.36  The first change began in 
the west coast with the criminalization of smoking opium.37  Opium 
was associated with Chinese people, who were at the time 
immigrating to the United States and working very hard for very little 
pay;38  However, the success of the Chinese immigrants was 
apparently taking away jobs from white workers, and so politicians 
got together to criminalize opium.39 
                                                 
31 See discussion infra Part III. 
32 See discussion infra Part IV. 
33 See discussion infra Part V. 
34 See discussion infra Part VI. 
35 See THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2 (discussing the history of the Nations 
anti–drug laws).  Lincoln historian, Richard Miller, discusses the societal changes 
in American history that prompted the criminalization of certain drugs.  Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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The second change came in 1914 with the targeting of 
“Negros” and the criminalization of cocaine.40  It was thought that 
African–Americans on cocaine could withstand police bullets and 
could work hard all day and night.41  The next change came about in 
the 1930’s with the criminalization of hemp.42  Hemp was a 
legitimate crop from colonial times, but in the 1930’s with the 
immigration of Mexican workers coming into the country and 
working hard and cheap, hemp changed into something dangerous 
and frightening called “marijuana,” leading the government to 
outlaw the drug.43  Thus, throughout these changes, what was 
technically being outlawed was not being Chinese, African–
American, or Mexican, but a habit associated with being Chinese, 
African–American, or Mexican.44 
 
A. You Can’t Fight A War Without Weapons: The Reagan–
Era Rise of Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences 
 
                                                 
40 Id.; see also Edward Huntington Williams, M.D., Negro Cocaine "Fiends" New 
Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 8, 1914), 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9901E5D61F3BE633A2575BC0A9649C946596D6CF (depicting a 
newspaper article from 1914 that illustrates how lower class African–American’s 
were viciously targeted for cocaine use). 
41 See Williams, supra note 40. 
42 THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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Mandatory minimum sentencing laws45 require strict, harsh, 
and automatic “one–size–fits–all”46 prison terms for offenders who 
                                                 
45 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2010); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DRUG 
PRIMER 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Drug.pdf [hereinafter DRUG PRIMER] 
(explaining that mandatory minimum statutory penalties are driven by the type and 
the quantity of the drug involved).  Mandatory minimum sentences can also be 
subjected to enhanced penalties if the offense involved death or serious bodily 
injury, or if the offender had any prior convictions for felony drug offenses.  DRUG 
PRIMER, supra at 2–6.  The statute’s prohibited acts and penalties section states 
that: 
In the case of a violation of subsection (a) [an unlawful drug offense] of this section 
involving . . . one–hundred grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of heroin . . . [,] such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment which may not be less than five years and not more than forty 
years[,] and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance 
shall be not less than twenty years or more than life . . . If any person commits such 
a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such 
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 
ten years and not more than life imprisonment and if death or serious bodily injury 
results from the use of such substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. 
§ 841(b)(1)(B). 
46 Gill, supra note 3, at 81; Letter from Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, Chair, 
Comm. on Criminal Law, Judicial Conference of the U.S. to Honorable Patrick J. 
Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.S. (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Judge-Bell-Chairman-Leahy-
mandatory-minimums.pdf [hereinafter Letter From Robert Holmes Bell] (citing 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws–The Issues: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 46 (2007) 
(statement of Judge Paul Cassell, Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law, Judicial 
Conference of the U.S.)).  The letter quotes Judge Cassell’s statement regarding 
mandatory minimum sentences: 
Mandatory minimum sentences mean one–size–fits–all injustice.  Each offender 
who comes before a federal judge for sentencing deserves to have their individual 
facts and circumstances considered in determining a just sentence.  Yes mandatory 
minimum sentences require judges to put blinders on to the unique facts and 
circumstances of particular cases. 
Letter From Robert Holmes Bell, supra. 
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are convicted within a certain class47 of criminal offenses.48  These 
congressionally defined punishments require that every judge 
“impose [them] on every offender who meets the statutory criteria, 
regardless of any other facts in the case.”49  Federal mandatory 
minimums are mostly concentrated on drug crimes,50 and re–
                                                 
47 See Federal Mandatory Minimums, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS 1, (Feb. 25, 2013), available at 
http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Chart%20All%20Fed%20MMs%202.25.13.pdf 
[hereinafter FAMM FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUMS] (noting that while most 
mandatory minimum sentences apply to drug offenses, Congress has enacted 
mandatory minimums for other offenses as well, including certain sex, gun, and 
child pornography offenses). 
48 Id. at 1–16 (listing all federal mandatory sentencing laws in effect as of August 
6, 2012); Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Federal Mandatory Minimum 
Drug Sentences: 21 U.S.C. § 841, available at 
http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Chart%20841--
Fed%20Drug%20MMs%208.6.12.pdf [hereinafter FAMM CHART: 21 U.S.C. § 
841] (illustrating and simplifying the prohibited acts and mandatory sentences for 
drugs as detailed in 21 U.S.C. §841). 
49 VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 13, at 2.  See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, 
Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (noting that mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws strip judges of the flexibility to modify individual 
sentences according to specific facts of their case and result in unduly harsh 
punishment). 
50 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1991), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_
and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/199108_RtC_Mandatory_Minimu
m.htm [hereinafter 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS] (finding that the primary 
offense of conviction for most mandatory minimum defendants involves drug 
activity); Mascharka, supra note 15, at 936 (“The brunt of federal mandatory 
minimum sentences is aimed at drug crimes.”).  While over forty–six percent of 
federal guideline offenders are involved in drug activity, over ninety–one percent 
of offenders sentenced under mandatory minimum provisions are involved in drug 
activity.  1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra. 
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emerged51 in full force during the “war on drugs” era52 of the 
1980’s.53 
In October of 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared war 
on drugs,54 and promised the nation a “planned, concerted campaign” 
against all drugs—”hard, soft, or otherwise.”55  In fulfillment of that 
                                                 
51 See 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 50, at 6 (noting that 
mandatory minimum sentences are not new to the federal criminal justice system); 
Mascharka, supra note 15, at 938–43 (illustrating a more in depth history of the 
rise of mandatory minimum provisions).  As early as 1790, mandatory penalties 
had been established for capital offenses. 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
supra. 
52 Fellner, supra note 16, at 262–65 (explaining that the rebirth of the drug war in 
the mid 1980’s was politically fueled and followed up by federal drug policy 
initiatives that increased federal funds for anti–drug efforts while simultaneously 
increasing the federal penalties for drug offenses).  Two years after Reagan’s newly 
revved up campaign against the war on drugs, crack cocaine, the cheaper, smoke–
able, base form of powder cocaine appeared on the scene.  The emergence of crack 
cocaine triggered an abundance of media and political attention surrounding 
“tough on crime” policies that emphasized harsh punishments as the solution to 
ridding the drug problem in America.  Id. at 261-63. 
53 Nunn, supra note 22, at 386–97 (focusing on the origins of the drug war and 
Reagan’s role in shaping the public’s fear and perception concerning the threat of 
illegal drug use). 
54 Alexander, supra note 22, at 15 (“President Richard Nixon was the first to coin 
the term a ‘war on drugs,’ but President Reagan turned the rhetorical war into a 
literal one.”).  The author points out that the initial “war on drugs” was largely 
rhetorical because President Nixon declared illegal drugs as “public enemy number 
one,” however he did so without proposing any significant changes in public 
policy.   The author further suggests that President Reagan turned the rhetorical 
war into a literal one when he officially announced the war on drugs in 1982, while 
drug crime was on the decline, and less than two percent of the American public 
even viewed drugs as the most significant problem facing the nation.  Id. 
55 Reagan, In Radio Talk, Vows Drive Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1982, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/03/us/no-headline-
194726.html%5D (quoting president Reagan saying, ''[w]e're making no excuses 
for drugs . . . [d]rugs are bad and we're going after them . . . . [a]nd we're going to 
win the war on drugs.''); cf., A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY 
ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-
drug-war (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter DPA: History of the Drug War] 
(crediting President Reagan’s wife, Nancy Reagan, with coining the slogan “Just 
Say No” for her zero tolerance campaign aimed at young people).  But see The 
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promise, Reagan increased anti–drug spending and increased the 
number of federal drug task forces; as a result, his presidency marked 
the start of a lengthy period of high incarceration rates for low–level, 
non–violent drug offenses.56 
Reagan’s declaration of war vilified drug offenders and 
promoted public contempt for illegal drug use.57  With the growing 
public consensus concerning the “menace” that drugs posed to 
society, and the emergence of crack cocaine on America’s streets in 
the mid 1980’s,58 Reagan’s crusade for a drug–free America fostered 
                                                 
Reagan–Era Drug War Legacy, STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Jun. 11, 2004), 
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/341/reagan.shtml [hereinafter Reagan–
Era Drug War Legacy] (“Nancy Reagan's 'Just Say No' did the work of dumbing 
down the debate on drugs in this country.”).  Some critics argued that Nancy 
Reagan’s “approach toward drug abuse prevention . . . [only] focused . . . on young 
people who never used drugs, while it completely ignored talking realistically to 
young people who were using drugs."  Reagan–Era Drug War Legacy, supra.  
Additionally: 
Instead of recognizing drug use as a complex problem and people as complex 
beings, she gave us the idea that we could fix everything if we just said no. If that 
were the case, we wouldn't have a drug problem in this country . . . There was no 
attempt to treat drug use as a medical problem. Anyone who used illicit drugs had 
a character flaw and needed to be jailed. 
Id. 
56 DPA: History of the Drug War, supra note 55 (describing the massive increase 
in rates of incarceration for non–violent drug offenses under the Reagan 
administration).  The number of people imprisoned for non–violent drug offenses 
increased from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997.  The increases are 
attributed to the political propaganda and hysteria about drugs, which led to the 
passage of harsh “draconian” penalties in Congress, thus rapidly increasing the 
prison population.  Id. 
57 See generally id.  (quoting Los Angeles Police Chief and founder of DARE drug 
education, Daryl Gates, saying that “casual drug users should be taken out and 
shot”). 
58 See Crack Cocaine: A Short History, DRUGFREEWORLD.ORG, 
http://www.drugfreeworld.org/drugfacts/crackcocaine/a-short-history.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013) (giving a brief history on the origin of crack, a cheaper, 
smoke–able, more profitable, crystallized form of cocaine).  While crack was 
developed during the cocaine boom of the 1970’s, its use spread to “epidemic” like 
proportions between 1984 and 1990.  Id.  The drug reportedly increased the number 
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the perfect political climate for the furtherance of his “get tough”59 
on drug policies.60  In response to extensive mass media61 coverage 
                                                 
of Americans addicted to cocaine from 4.2 million to 5.8 million, and infiltrated 
all but four states in the United States.  Id. 
59 See Fellner, supra note 16, at 262.  The “tough on crime” policies that 
emphasized harsh and punitive punishment philosophies as the “key to curbing 
drugs and restoring law and order in America,” were based on misinformation 
about drugs and its users, naïve understanding of drag war logic, and misguided 
concerns about the needs of poor urban communities.  Id. 
60 THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2 (quoting Harvard University professor 
William Julius Wilson, “every war starts with propaganda”). 
61 Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 841, 854 (2010); Kimani Paul–Emile, Making Sense of Drug 
Regulation: A Theory of Law for Drug Control Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 691, 734 (2010); Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare 
and Young Black Males in America, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 290 (2012); 
Spencer A. Stone, Note, Federal Drug Sentencing–What Was Congress Smoking? 
The Uncertain Distinction Between "Cocaine" and "Cocaine Base" in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 311–12 (2007); Susan 
Okie, The Epidemic That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27coca.html?pagewanted=1.  See 
generally Peter Kerr, Syphilis Surge With Crack Use Raises Fears on Spread of 
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 29, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/29/nyregion/syphilis-surge-with-crack-use-
raises-fears-on-spread-of-aids.html?src=pm 1 (linking crack use in poor 
neighborhoods to the accelerating spread of sexually transmitted diseases and 
AIDS among heterosexuals).  “In the months leading up to the passage of the 1986 
Act,  NBC News ran four hundred reports on crack, totaling fifteen hours of airtime, 
and Time Magazine named crack the ‘Issue of the Year.’”  Stone, supra.  The 
media played a crucial role in spreading communal fear regarding the infiltration 
of crack cocaine throughout urban areas.  Moriearty & Carson, supra.  More 
specifically, the media was extremely racially focused on crack cocaine use by 
African–Americans.  Id.  Additionally, when crack cocaine became a nationwide 
epidemic in the 1980’s and ’90s, there were widespread fears that prenatal 
exposure to the drug would produce a generation of severely damaged children.  
Okie, supra.  The media portrayed this generation of severely damaged children as 
“crack babies”—a purported biological underclass of children who would require 
government support for the rest of their lives.  Ahrens, supra.  Moreover, the media 
attempted to link the crack baby epidemic to other inner–city crime, such as 
prostitution and gang violence.  Emile, supra.  Furthermore, the media aided in 
spreading more nationwide fear by linking crack cocaine to the widespread 
appearance of AIDS in heterosexuals. Kerr, supra.  While homosexual activity and 
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and wide–spread public paranoia62 surrounding the perceived63 crack 
epidemic,64 Congress enacted the Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (the 
“ADAA”).65  The media’s role in creating public and congressional 
awareness of crack cocaine created immense political opportunity,66 
and supported the cultural mindset that the ADAA criminal laws 
                                                 
intravenous drug use was already a well perceived avenue for the spreading of the 
HIV virus which causes AIDS, Kerr’s article points out that a rising number of 
young people, that had no experience with intravenous drug use, or homosexual 
activity, were testing positive for HIV.  Id. at 3.  The article suggests that crack use 
causes its users to engage in sexually promiscuous behavior with a large number 
of people, including sex with strangers, sex without condoms, and prostituting sex 
for crack or money.  Id. at 2.  The article indicates that the use of crack leads to 
those sexual practices, which exposes its users to the high risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases, and the transmission of AIDS.  Id. 
62 Adam M. Acosta, Comment, Len Bias’ Death Still Haunts Crack–Cocaine 
Offenders After Twenty Years: Failing To Reduce Disproportionate Crack–
Cocaine Sentences 18 U.S.C. § 3582, 53 HOW. L.J. 825, 826 (2010) (noting that 
the death of Len Bias, a basketball star, drew a large amount of media attention to 
the use of crack–cocaine); Okie, supra note 61 (giving examples of newspaper 
headlines that discussed crack cocaine and its effects on babies).  A few hours after 
being drafted to play basketball for the Boston Celtics, Len Bias died from a 
cocaine overdose.  Acosta, supra.  “His death immediately drew media attention 
to the use of crack–cocaine, which was subjected to a high level of public scrutiny 
where public shock and fear distorted facts about crack–cocaine.”  Id. at 826–27. 
63 See generally REEFER MADNESS (George A. Hirliman Productions 1936) 
(providing an example of the media fueled propaganda surrounding the cannabis 
smear campaign from the 1930’s, and how it shaped societies falsely perceived 
notions about the drug). 
64 See generally Ricky Ross Biography, THE BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, 
http://www.biography.com/people/ricky-ross-481828 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) 
(describing the life of Ricky Ross, a former drug kingpin in the 1980’s); Rayful 
Edmond III Biography, THE BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, 
http://www.biography.com/people/rayful-edmond-iii-547286 (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013) (describing the life of Rayful Edmond III, a notorious drug dealer in the 
1980’s who made millions of dollars supplying cocaine). 
65 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010). 
66 Nunn, supra note 22, at 390 (explaining how the opportunity for political 
advancement led to bi–partisan support).  “For each anti–drug measure that passed, 
it became necessary to further escalate the war so that no one, Democrat or 
Republican, executive or legislative branch, could be called soft on this critical 
issue.”  Id. 
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would save America from drug–induced ruin.67  Both Democrats and 
Republicans were on board to pass this whole new generation of 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws.68 
The ADAA’s mandatory minimum sentencing laws were 
created in an attempt to “reduce unwarranted disparity, increase 
certainty and uniformity, and correct past patterns of undue leniency 
for certain categories of serious offenses.”69  The mandatory 
minimum provisions took away the flexibility and discretion70 a 
                                                 
67 Id. at 389–90.  Widespread public support added political value to the War on 
Drugs and solidified the publics backing of harsh new mandatory laws aimed at 
punish drug offenders and keeping America safe.  Id. 
68 Alexander, supra note 22, at 17; Nunn supra note 22, at 390; Mascharka supra 
note 15, at 964–65.  Between 1986 and the mid–1990’s, Congress passed a large 
amount of new additions to the mandatory minimum drug laws.  Mascharka, supra, 
at 935.  These new changes came about every two years, coinciding with the 
election year cycle.  Id.  In Mascharka’s comment, he also explains that: 
Regardless of the mounting evidence indicating that long mandatory minimum 
sentences for nonviolent criminals are inefficient and often arbitrary, “in the 
current contentious political climate, the political system seems locked in place.”  
Capitalizing on the public's fear of crime has been an extremely successful political 
tool in the past two decades.  Politicians know that when running for election they 
cannot go wrong by portraying themselves as “tough on crime” and “hard on 
drugs.”  Both major political parties currently embrace the tough–on–crime 
mantra. 
Id. at 964–65. 
69 See 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 50, at 1; Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 201 
(1993) (identifying six objectives of mandatory minimum sentences).  Of the six 
objectives, appropriately severe “just punishment, effective deterrence, and 
disparity reduction” have been the goals most prominently referred to by 
legislators.  Schulhofer, supra. 
70 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009); MURDOCH, supra note 11; 
Mascharka, supra note 15, at 943.  Judicial discretion is defined as the “exercise 
of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the circumstances . . . 
.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra.  A criticism of mandatory minimums is that 
the sentencing provisions remove discretion traditionally held by “neutral” judges 
and transfer power to “adversarial” prosecutors.  Mascharka, supra.  In her 1999 
D.C. Bar “Legends in the Law” interview, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia is quoted saying, “[a]s a consequence 
of the mandatory sentences, we know that justice is not always done . . . .  [Y]ou 
cannot dispense equal justice by playing a numbers game. Judgment and discretion 
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federal judge once had to tailor sentences to the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case.71  Now, judges are bound by the ADAA, 
which imposes mandatory minimum sentences and extended terms 
of incarceration.72  The legislature’s objective intent73 behind 
imposing the new mandatory sentencing laws was to promote a 
systematic penological74 approach, whereby all drug offenders would 
be subject to, and on notice of, the incarceration penalties associated 
with their criminal conduct.75 
                                                 
and common sense are essential.”  MURDOCH, supra.  Prior to his recent retirement, 
Judge Stanley Sporkin sat on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
for fourteen years, and also commented on the loss of judicial discretion.  Sporkin 
noted that mandatory minimums have resulted in the incarceration of "people who 
are not a threat to society for an ungodly number of years.”  In contrast, William 
Otis, an assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia from 1981 to 
1999, and defender of mandatory sentencing laws, suggests that, “the loss of 
judicial discretion judges complain about so vociferously has been a small price to 
pay for the increase in public safety that has resulted from the imposition of 
mandatory sentences.”  Id. 
71 See note 3 and accompanying text. 
72 Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 
40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 343 (1995) (explaining the 1986 ADAA mandates).  The 
ADAA mandates a five to forty year sentence, without probation or parole, for first 
times offenders convicted of possession with intent to distribute small quantities 
of designated drugs.  The ADAA also mandates a sentence of ten years to life, 
without probation or parole, for first time offenders convicted of possession with 
intent to distribute larger quantities of drugs.  Id. 
73 Tonry, supra note 21, at 67 (noting that policy makers who promote mandatory 
minimum penalties usually offer three erroneous justifications for their 
effectiveness); Mascharka, supra note 15, at 940 (explaining that Congress’ 
primary motive for enacting this change was in response to fading public 
confidence in the criminal justice system due to perceived “soft” judges who were 
sentencing culpable criminals too lightly).  Supporters of mandatory minimums 
incorrectly assert that the penalties promote transparency, assure evenhandedness, 
and prevent crime.  Tonry, supra. 
74 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 1248; MERRIAM–WEBSTER'S 
DICTIONARY OF LAW 388 (1996). Penology is defined as “a branch of criminology 
dealing with prison management and the treatment of offenders.” MERRIAM–
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW, supra. 
75 See note 13 and accompanying text; Spencer, supra note 72, at 345 (specifying 
congressional goals associated with the incarceration penalties in the 1986 ADAA 
and the 1988 Omnibus Act).  But see Tonry, supra note 21 (explaining that 
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Two years later, with the political climate still heavily 
concentrated on the war on drugs, Congress passed the Omnibus 
Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (the “Omnibus Act”).76  While the 
ADAA established “a new regime of non–parolable,77 mandatory 
                                                 
congressional efforts are not achieved); Douglas B. Marlowe, J.D., Ph.D. et. al., 
Amenability to Treatment of Drug Offenders, 67–SEP FED. PROBATION 40 (stating 
that incarceration has done little to reduce illicit drug use).  Congressional efforts 
to promote “penological goals of specific and general deterrence, and 
incapacitation” were purportedly for the purpose of sending out clear cut, hard–
lined messages to drug offenders.  Spencer, supra.  However, there is no credible 
evidence that suggests that the definite knowledge of punishment or incapacitation 
that mandatory minimums are supposed to impose, produce any significant 
deterrent effects.  Tonry, supra.  Conversely, statistics provide that, eighty–five 
percent of drug–abusing offenders released from prison returned to drug use within 
one year, and ninety–five percent returned to drug use within three years.  
Marlowe, supra. 
76 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2013); David H. Angeli, A "Second Look" at Crack 
Cocaine Sentencing Policies: One More Try for Federal Equal Protection, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1211, 1238 (1997) (noting that because of profound public concern 
about the widespread availability of drugs, Congress passed the Omnibus Act in 
an effort to attack supply lines and go after large drug distributors); Frontline, 
Thirty Year’s of America’s Drug War a Chronology, PBS.ORG, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (summarizing the 
event that took place Oct. 27, 1986, when President Reagan signed The Anti–Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986).  Congress believed that harsher minimum penalties associated 
with higher quantities of drugs would deter potential offenders who intended to 
distribute or traffic throughout communities.  Angeli, supra at 1239.  The statute 
defines attempt and conspiracy, and provides that: “[a]ny person who attempts or 
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the 
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was 
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”  21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963. 
77 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 1227; Conyers, supra note 19, at 
380; Nicole Flatlow, Meet Five People Serving Draconian Drug Sentences Thanks 
To Mandatory Minimum Laws, THINKPROGRESS.ORG, (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/13/2453781/five-draconian-drug-
sentences-fueled-by-mandatory-minimum-laws/.  Parole is defined as “[t]he 
conditional release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence has 
been served.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra.  Although some sentences are 
non–parolable, parole is usually “granted for good behavior.”  Id.  The Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal inmates.  Conyers, supra.  Those 
sentenced to mandatory minimums, even for non–violent drug offenses, are not 
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minimum sentences for drug trafficking offenses that tied the 
minimum penalty to the amount of drugs involved in the offense,”78 
the Omnibus Act generated an even more wide–ranging and 
extensive set of quantity–based minimum drug sentences.79  Most 
significantly, the Omnibus Act applied the mandatory minimum 
penalties to “conspiracies”80 to distribute or import drugs, 
                                                 
eligible for parole.  Flatlow, supra.  Even when an offender has obtained proper 
drug treatment and counseling, has rehabilitated themself, and is not viewed as at 
risk for committing crime in the future by the Court, they are still not eligible for 
parole.  Id.  Additionally, the abolition of parole is one cause of the growing federal 
prison population.  Conyers, supra. 
78 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 50, at 8. 
79 Id., at 8–9; Mascharka, supra note 15, at 941–42 (explaining the rise of 
mandatory minimum provisions from the ADAA to the Omnibus Act). See 
generally  Jennifer M. Cox, Frequent Arrests, Harsh Sentencing, and the 
Disproportionate Impact They Have on African Americans and Their Community, 
3 S. REGIONAL BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS'N L.J. 17, 19 (2009) (describing the 
Omnibus Acts impact on the prison population).  The new mandatory sentences 
prescribed in the Omnibus Act were enacted in an effort to targeting larger drug 
dealers, while also covering mid–level players.  1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 50.  Additionally, the Omnibus Act prescribed a mandatory 
five year prison sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine.  Id.  As a result, 
the number of low–level drug offenders in prison has increased by 110 percent.  
Cox, supra.  Drug offenders now occupy sixty–one percent of the federal prison 
population.  Id. 
80 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2013); DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES, supra note 25, at 3 (explaining the difference between the 1986 
ADAA and the 1988 Omnibus Act).  See generally Ferranti, supra note 24 
(explaining the concept of being charged as a conspirator through the story of 
Clarence Aaron).  The main difference between the 1986 ADAA and the 1988 
Omnibus Act was the extension of mandatory minimum penalties, “to reach 
conspirators as well as principals, ensuring that minimum penalties would apply 
with equal force to peripheral players.”  DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES, supra.  Clarence Aaron’s story offers an unsettling example of how 
the extension of mandatory minimum penalties to conspirators impacted this 
twenty–four year old, first time, low–level, non–violent offender.  Ferranti, supra.  
Aaron was a student and football player at Southern University in Baton Rouge.  
He had never been arrested or in trouble with the law before.  Aaron was sentenced 
to three life terms of imprisonment for his conspirator role in introducing a buyer 
and seller, and for being present during the sale and transaction of cocaine.  
Although Aaron never actually touched any drugs, he would have earned $1,500 
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irrespective of the offender’s level of culpability or involvement.81  
The Reagan–era drug war ideologies that formulated the strict 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws set forth in the ADAA and 
Omnibus Act have drastically impacted the federal prison 
                                                 
for his minor role in introducing the buyer and seller.  The article makes a stark 
comparison, noting that Aaron’s three life terms for his minor role in a cocaine 
deal, is effectively three times the sentence imposed upon convicted terrorist, 
Faisal Shahzad, who in 2010 tried to set off a car bomb in New York City’s Times 
Square.  Id. 
81 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2013); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 118–19 (1995), 
available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_
and_Reports/Drug_Topics/199502_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/CHAP5-
8.PDF [hereinafter 1995 COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY] (noting that 
the Omnibus Act was designed to catch drug kingpins); Mascharka, supra note 15, 
at 941 (noting that a significant aspect of the mandatory minimum penalties 
associated with the Omnibus Act was that the penalties now applied equally from 
major distributors to low–level participants).  But see Angeli, supra note 76, at 
1239 (explaining that contrary to congressional goals, mandatory minimum 
sentences are most often applied to low–level offenders).  When Congress set the 
mandatory minimum penalties for drug trafficking offenses in the Omnibus Act, 
“one of its primary objectives sought to ensure that major and serious drug dealers 
received harsher, more certain punishment.”  1995 COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY, supra.  Congress intended for “major” drug traffickers to 
receive higher penalties, because offenders who distributed higher quantities of a 
given drug inflicted “greater societal harms due to increased availability of the drug 
to more people.”  In 1986, The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime defined 
“major traffickers” as “the manufacturers or the heads of organizations who are 
responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities;” and “serious 
traffickers” as "the managers of the retail level traffic, the person who is filling the 
bags of heroin, packaging crack cocaine into vials . . . and doing so in substantial 
street quantities."  Id. at 119.  The Omnibus Act subjected “major” drug traffickers 
to a ten–year mandatory minimum sentence for a first–time offense, and subjected 
first–time “serious” drug traffickers to a five–year mandatory minimum sentence.  
Id. at 118. 
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population82 and significantly resulted in disparate consequences on 
the minority83 population.84 
 
B. The Penalty Conundrum: Powder Cocaine v. Crack 
Cocaine 
 
As a result of the 1986 ADAA and 1988 Omnibus Act,85 
crack offenses were punished more harshly than any other drug, and 
further, crack offenses were punished one–hundred times86 more 
                                                 
82 See note 79 and accompanying text; see also Conyers, supra note 19, at 377 
(stating that 700 out of every 100,000 Americans is behind bars); Spencer, supra 
note 72, at 365 (noting that as a consequence of the ADAA and the Omnibus Act, 
the number of drug offenders convicted in federal courts has more than tripled). 
83 See DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES, supra note 25 (“Research 
has shown that certain policies and procedures in the criminal and juvenile justice 
systems have a disparate impact on the African American and Latino communities 
in the United States. Mandatory minimums systematically and disproportionately 
affect minority groups in this country.”). 
84 See Heather C. West et al., Prisoners in 2009, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., 
9 (2011) available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (stating that 
federally, African–American men and women are incarcerated at much higher rates 
than Caucasian and Hispanic men and women); D.J. Silton, U.S. Prisons and 
Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 
53, 61 (2002) (contrasting Caucasian and African–American increases in drug 
arrests).  Between 1976 and 1989, the total number of Caucasian drug arrests grew 
by seventy percent, compared to a 450% increase among African–Americans.  
Silton, supra.  From 1986 to 1991, the number of Caucasians incarcerated for drug 
offenses increased by fifty percent, while the number of African–Americans 
incarcerated increased by 350%.  Id. 
85 Angeli, supra note 76, at 1239–40 (explaining that the 1988 Omnibus Act made 
crack the only drug with a mandatory minimum penalty for a first–time offense of 
simple possession).  Paradoxically, although Congress enacted the Omnibus Act in 
an effort to target drug kingpins and attack the supply chain for cocaine, the Act 
“merely subjected the possessor of between one and five grams of crack to a 
mandatory five–year sentence, while the trafficker of the ‘cocaine’ that so troubled 
Congress would have to deal 100 to 500 times as much to be subject to the same 
sentence.”  Id. 
86 LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing–Making Disparate Impact Evidence 
Relevant in Crack Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 387 
(2011) (“For nearly a quarter of a century, federal law penalized crack cocaine 
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severely than its pharmacological twin,87 powder cocaine.88  The new 
statutory laws89 mandated a five–year mandatory minimum sentence 
for possession of only five grams of crack90 cocaine versus a five–
                                                 
offenses at a one hundred–to–one sentencing ratio compared to powder cocaine 
offenses.”). 
87 Nunn, supra note 22, at 396; Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of 
U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 751 (1993) 
(discussing the similarities between the two drugs; crack and powder cocaine); 
Cocaine and Crack Facts, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-facts/cocaine-and-crack-facts (last visited Oct. 
23, 2013) [hereinafter Cocaine and Crack Facts]; THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 
2.  Disparity in sentencing exists despite the fact that “cocaine is cocaine” and 
“there are no physiological differences in effect between the powder and the crack 
form of the drug.” Nunn, supra.  All crack cocaine comes from powder cocaine, 
and the only difference between the two is the simple process of turning the powder 
into a smoke–able form called “rocks.”  Cocaine and Crack Facts, supra.  This 
process is achieved by nothing more than processing cocaine with baking soda, 
water, and heat from an oven.  THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra. 
88 DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES, supra note 25, at 4; Emile, 
supra note 61, at 692–93; Gary Fields, Shorter Sentences Sought for Crack, WALL 
ST. J., (Apr. 30, 2009), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124101257332168605.html (noting the imbalance 
between crack and powder cocaine sentences).  The United States Sentencing 
Commission published reports in 1995, 1997, and 2002 demonstrating that the 
severe penalties for crack cocaine were unwarranted in light of the fact that crack 
and powder cocaine were indistinguishable from one another.  DISPARATE IMPACT 
ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES, supra.  Crack cocaine and powder cocaine both share 
the same active ingredients and the same psychotropic effects, however simple 
possession of the crack form imposes the most severe penalties existing for any 
drug.  Emile, supra. 
89 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2010). The statute provides that: 
(a) Unlawful acts[;] [e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful 
for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance; or . . . (b) Penalties[;] . . . (i) 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of heroin; (ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of (II) cocaine . . . . 
Id. 
90 FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 2 (2010), 
available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_CrackBriefingSheet.pdf 
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year mandatory minimum sentence for 500 grams of powder 
cocaine.91  The notion underlying the one–hundred–to–one 
sentencing ratio was that cocaine was presumably more hazardous in 
its crack form than in its powder form.92  It is now evident, however, 
that those presumptions were false and based on misconceived 
assumptions about the drug in both of its comparative forms.93 
On August 3, 2010, Congress passed into law the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (the “FSA”).94  The FSA raised the quantity 
                                                 
[hereinafter 2010 CRACK BRIEFING SHEET] (explaining that five grams of crack 
cocaine weighs less than two sugar packets, and yields a quantity of about ten to 
fifty doses). 
91 Id.  (contrasting the mandatory minimum trigger requirements for powder 
cocaine versus crack cocaine).  For the same five–year penalty to be triggered for 
powder cocaine, the offense would need to involve 500 grams of powder cocaine, 
which yields between 2,500 and 5,000 doses.  Id. 
92 See id. at 3; Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: 
Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2546 (2010).  Crack cocaine was considered “a social 
menace more dangerous than powder cocaine in its physiological and psychotropic 
effects.”  2010 CRACK BRIEFING SHEET, supra.  Based on the assumptions about 
crack, Congress listed five justifications for the disparate one–hundred–to–one 
ratio.  Beaver, supra.  The five justifications were: 
(1) the addictive quality of crack cocaine, (2) that crack cocaine was associated 
with violent crime, (3) that the use of crack cocaine among pregnant women posed 
threats to children in utero, (4) that more young people were using crack cocaine, 
and (5) that the low cost of crack cocaine made it especially prevalent and more 
likely to be consumed in large quantities. 
Id. 
93 155 Cong. Rec. S10488–01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) 
(“[W]e have learned a great deal in the last 20 years. We now know the 
assumptions that led us to create this disparity were wrong.”); Sarah Hyser, Two 
Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took the "Fair" Out of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 509 (2012).  The 
congressional members who voted for the 1986 ADAA admit today that the 
assumptions that led them to create the sentencing disparities were false.  Hyser, 
supra. 
94 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 960).  The FSA does not eliminate the disparity 
completely, however it attempts to correct the disparity by reducing the 
disproportionate ratio between the two categories of crack and cocaine offenders.  
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of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the five and ten year mandatory 
minimum sentences, thereby reducing the penalty disparity for crack 
cocaine previously set in the 1986 ADAA.95  The FSA lowered the 
previous ratio of one hundred–to–one to a current ratio of eighteen–
to–one.96  The FSA’s modification of the federal sentencing policies 
marks progress geared towards reducing the rigid mandatory 
minimum sentencing requirements for low–level crack cocaine 
offenses .97 
However, despite the FSA’s scientific knowledge pertaining 
to the almost identical composition and effects of crack and powder 
cocaine, and despite bipartisan recognition that the former ratio 
disparity was overly harsh and unjust,98 there is still congressional 
                                                 
The FSA reduced the previous one hundred–to–one crack ratio to a current ratio of 
eighteen–to–one.  Id. 
95 2010 CRACK BRIEFING SHEET, supra note 90 (discussing the reduction in 
disparate treatment of crack cocaine sentences with the new ratio set forth by the 
FSA); Norman L. Reimer & Lisa M. Wayne, From the Practitioners' Perch: How 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and the Prosecution's Unfettered Control over 
Sentence Reductions for Cooperation Subvert Justice and Exacerbate Racial 
Disparity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 166 (2011); Tyler B. Parks, The Unfairness of 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1008 (2012).  Prior to 
the passage of the FSA, “five grams of crack cocaine and five hundred grams of 
powder cocaine were treated the same for sentencing purposes.”  Parks, supra.  
Currently, since the FSA reduced the ratio and raised the quantity of crack 
necessary to trigger the same sentence, “twenty–eight grams of crack cocaine and 
five hundred grams of powder cocaine are [now] treated the same.”  Id. 
96 See note 94 and accompanying text. 
97 Davis, supra note 86, at 375 (noting that “[w]hile this reduction does not 
eliminate the crack/powder cocaine disparity, the Fair Sentencing Act is a 
breakthrough after more than twenty years of sentencing under the one hundred–
to–one ratio”).  But see Fields, supra note 88 (referencing the oppositional belief 
that the reduction in disparity should be achieved by raising the penalties for 
powder cocaine, not by lowering the penalties for crack cocaine).  James Pasco, 
executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police, is quoted saying that “the 
remedy would be to increase the penalties for powder cocaine so all criminals are 
treated equally.”  Fields, supra. 
98 2010 CRACK BRIEFING SHEET, supra note 90 (noting that the new legislation 
limiting the mandatory minimum sentences for low–level crack cocaine offenses 
was supported by bipartisan leaders who believed the prior sentencing laws were 
overly harsh and unjust). 
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resistance to eliminate the scientifically unsupportable eighteen–to–
one disparity completely.99  While there was a compromise and a 
significant reduction in the ratio calculation, there is still an 
unnecessary and arbitrary targeting of crack cocaine that will 
continue to have a disproportionately negative impact on the 
African–American community.100 
 
C. Two Exceptions to Mandatory Minimums Sentences 
 
There are currently only two exceptions to mandatory 
minimum sentences that would allow a judge to impose a sentence 
lower than the prescribed statutory minimum.101  These two 
exceptions are known as the substantial assistance102 and “safety 
valve”103 provisions.104  The substantial assistance exception allows 
                                                 
99 See Fields, supra note 88 (“The U.S. Sentencing Commission has tried since 
1995 . . . to bring the penalties for crack crimes more in line with powder cocaine, 
but those recommendations have been rejected by Congress.”). 
100 See discussion infra Part III B. 
101 Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges 
Can Avoid Imposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 
(2008) (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission recently listed only two relief 
mechanisms by which judges can avoid imposing a mandatory sentence). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2010).  Subsection (e) of the statute grants the 
Government limited authority to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory 
minimum when a defendant has given substantial assistance in the investigation of 
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.  Id. 
103 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2010).  Subsection (f) of the statute permits a reduced 
prison sentence when: 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point . . . (2) the 
defendant did not use violence . . .  or possess a firearm . . . in connection with the 
offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any 
person; (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
others in the offense . . . and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise . 
. . and (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has 
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant 
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct 
or of a common scheme or plan . . . . 
Id. 
104 Greenblatt, supra note 101, at 5–6. 
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for a downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence only 
upon a government motion asserting that the offender has provided 
substantial assistance in the prosecution of others who have 
committed an offense.105  Substantial assistance is limited in its 
authority and is only valid when an offender furnishes information to 
the prosecution that is substantial106 or pertinent to the investigation 
or conviction of other criminals.107  While the substantial assistance 
exception applies to all mandatory minimum sentences, it applies 
almost exclusively in drug cases.108  Providing useful information 
and brokering deals with the Government in order to receive sentence 
reductions is not a new facet of the American sentencing system; 
however, when coupled with the imposition of otherwise harsh and 
long mandatory drug sentences, this function creates a troubling 
paradox. 109  Basically, instead of targeting drug kingpins and 
                                                 
105 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2010).  This provision is limited in its authority and is 
only valid upon a Government motion asserting that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.  Id. 
106 See United States v. Flores, 559 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
although the defendant provided truthful information to government agents, the 
assistance provided did not result in arrests, indictments, or convictions, and thus 
was of “little value” and not substantial assistance); see also Daniel Donovan & 
John Rhodes, The Prisoner’s Dilemma Becomes the Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be a 
Zealous Advocate or a Judas Goat?, 35–JAN MONT. LAW. 8, 29 (2010) (noting 
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office, on its own, determines whether a defendant’s 
cooperation is “substantial” or not). 
107 Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 106 (explaining what “substantial assistance” 
entails).  Substantial assistance can include anything from “a written proffer, verbal 
information, acting undercover, repeated debriefings with law enforcement 
officers, meetings with prosecutors and defense attorneys, . . . [to] testifying in 
court or before a grand jury.”  Id. 
108 Greenblatt, supra note 101, at 5 (noting that the substantial assistance provision 
is used almost exclusively in drug cases). 
109 Schulhofer, supra note 69, at 212; Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low–
Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1471, 1493 (2000).  “Rewarding defendants for their cooperation with the 
government has a disparate impact on those defendants who are unable to provide 
‘substantial’ assistance . . . [because] it benefits those most deeply involved in 
crime, while low–level defendants have no comparable means of reducing their 
sentences.”  Froyd, supra. 
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subjecting them to longer prison sentences, what the substantial 
assistance exception has actually created is a paradoxical “statutory 
escape hatch,” where “[t]he big fish get the big breaks, . . . [and] the 
minnows are left to face severe and sometimes draconian 
penalties.”110 
The safety valve provision is even more limited and narrow 
in its scope, and applies exclusively to federal drug offenses.111  
Safety valves are congressionally created laws that allow courts to 
give an offender a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum 
requires, but only if the offender or his offense meets certain 
requirements.112  They allow “offenders ‘who are the least culpable 
participants in drug trafficking offenses to receive strictly regulated 
                                                 
110 Schulhofer, supra note 69, at 213; see also Ferranti, supra note 24 
(representing the minnow facing an extremely harsh sentence); Ricky Ross Bio, 
supra note 64 (representing the big fish getting the big break).  Logically, 
defendants who are drug leaders or kingpins are most “in the know,” and thus have 
the most contacts to give up or information to provide.  Schulhofer, supra at 212.  
Consequently, the more culpable drug kingpins “have the most ‘substantial 
assistance’ to offer,” placing them in better positions to negotiate away prison years 
on their sentences.  Id.  For example, Clarence Aaron played a minor role during a 
drug transaction, where he introduced a buyer and seller, and then was present 
during the sale and exchange of the drugs.  Ferranti, supra.  Although he never 
actually touched any drugs, and would have only earned $1,500 for his small part 
in introducing the two parties, he was sentenced to three life terms.  Id.  Out of all 
of the offenders who received prison sentences stemming from this conspiracy, 
Aaron’s sentence was the longest because he refused to “cooperate” with 
authorities.  Id.  In stark contrast, Ricky Ross was the epitome of a drug kingpin.  
Ricky Ross Bio, supra.  He was responsible for creating crack and cocaine markets 
in several states throughout the U.S., and at the height of his drug career was selling 
two to three million dollars of crack on a daily basis.  Id.  When Ross was first 
arrested in 1990 he pled guilty and began serving a ten year sentence, however he 
only actually served a little over four years of it when he was given the opportunity 
to help police by testifying in a federal case.  Id. 
111 See Greenblatt, supra note 101, at 5–6 (stating that “[t]he ‘safety valve,’ 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(f), is available only in drug cases”); SAFETY VALVE NUTSHELL, 
supra note 3.  The federal safety valve “was created in 1994, when Congress 
realized that many first–time, low–level, and nonviolent drug offenders were 
receiving mandatory minimums that did not fit them or their crimes.”  SAFETY 
VALVE NUTSHELL, supra. 
112 See SAFETY VALVE NUTSHELL, supra note 3. 
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reductions in prison sentences for mitigating factors’ recognized in 
the federal sentencing guidelines.”113  The provision utilizes a five–
part test,114 and if an offender meets all five parts of the test criteria, 
the judge must sentence the person below the mandatory minimum 
requirement, to a term the court deems appropriate.115  While the 
premise behind the safety–valve exception clearly has recognizable 
value, it is unfortunately way too limited and far too subject–able to 
government manipulation.116 
 
                                                 
113 Greenblatt, supra note 101 at 6 (quoting Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Laws–The Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 14–15 (2007) (statement of Ricardo H. Hinojosa, 
Chair, United States Sentencing Commission). 
114 SAFETY VALVE NUTSHELL, supra note 3 (explaining that the federal safety 
valve requires the court to sentence an offender below the statutory minimum 
“[i]f—and only if—” all five criteria for the test are met).  The test requirements 
are as follows: 
(1) no one was harmed during the offense, (2) the offender has little or no history 
of criminal convictions, (3) the offender did not use violence or a gun, (4) the 
offender was not a leader or organizer of the offense, and (5) the offender told the 
prosecutor all that they know about the offense. 
Id. 
115 How Federal Sentencing Works: Mandatory Minimums, Statutory Maximums, 
and Sentencing Guidelines, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS 2 (Sept. 
15, 2012), available at http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Chart-How-
Fed-Sentencing-Works-9.5.pdf [hereinafter FAMM HOW FEDERAL SENTENCING 
WORKS] (explaining the safety valve and substantial assistance rule exceptions and 
how they apply).  See generally Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 106, at 30 
(providing an example of how narrowly the rule applies).  The safety valve 
provision is very strict and narrow in its application.  FAMM HOW FEDERAL 
SENTENCING WORKS, supra.  For example, if a first time offender was arrested in 
their home, however they happened to have a lawfully owned, unloaded hunting 
riffle in their bedroom or closet, they would be ineligible for the safety valve 
departure because part four of the test requirements would have been violated.  
Donovan & Rhodes, supra. 
116 See Reimer & Wayne, supra note 95, at 175.  But see Greenblatt, supra note 
101, at 6 (“Statistics show that 23.5% of mandatory sentences in drug cases are 
avoided through this statutory provision alone.”). 
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III. Ways in Which Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences 
Disproportionately Impact and Imprison the 
Underprivileged African–American Community 
 
Not only do mandatory minimum sentencing laws subvert the 
entire notion of equality that they were intended to create, but they 
actually exacerbate racial disparity in poor disadvantages 
communities and “exaggerate the types of law enforcement practices 
that foster as much crime as they prevent.”117  Throughout “every 
stage of the criminal justice process, mandatory minimums 
contribute to disparate impact among racial groups.”118  However, of 
all the communities impacted by the drug war and its resulting harsh 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws, “poor African–Americans 
have arguably experienced the most dramatic and lasting effects . . . 
.”119  Mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws emphasize the racial 
inequities that are intrinsically manifest characteristics of the federal 
criminal justice system by unconsciously employing discriminatory 
sentencing rules and operational practices.120  Accordingly, poor and 
disadvantaged minorities are imprisoned for drug offenses at rates 
that significantly exceed their percentage of the drug–using 
                                                 
117 Reimer & Wayne, supra note 95, at 160. 
118 Id.;  see Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual 
for Practitioners and Policymakers, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (2008), available 
at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.pdf 
[hereinafter REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY MANUAL] (“[W]hole segments of 
American communities have become marginalized.  One fundamental aspect of 
this marginalization is the disparate treatment of per–sons of color which occurs 
incrementally across the entire spectrum of America's criminal justice system.”). 
119 Nekima Levy–Pounds, Can These Bones Live? A Look at the Impacts of the 
War on Drugs on Poor African–American Children and Families, 7 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L. J. 353, 354 (2010). 
120 DISPARATE IMPACT ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES, supra note 25, at 7 
(explaining that federal sentencing laws in the United States impose heavy burdens 
on defendants of color).  The disparate treatment of racial minorities is believed to 
be a consequence of the sentencing rules and practices associated with mandatory 
minimum provisions —expressly crack cocaine penalties and governmental 
charging decisions.  Id. 
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population.121  African–Americans make up only about twelve 
percent of the U.S. population, and constitute only about thirteen 
percent of the nation’s drug–user population.122  Further, while 
studies indicate that African–Americans use alcohol and drugs less 
frequently than Caucasians, African-Americans make up thirty–eight 
percent of people arrested for committing a drug offense, and 
represent fifty–nine percent of people who are imprisoned for drug 
offenses.123  The War Against Drugs, with its attributably aggressive 
and harsh mandatory sentencing of drug offenders, is the culprit 
responsible for this disproportionately high level of African–
American incarceration.124 
 
A. The De Facto Racist Crack Cocaine Sentencing Disparity 
 
Although drug laws are seemingly race–neutral on their face, 
the mandatory cocaine sentencing dichotomy clearly implicates 
racially discriminatory considerations effecting the African–
American community.125  Though Congress’ attempt was intended to 
ensure uniformity in sentencing,126 the sentencing disparities 
associated with the calculation of powder cocaine and crack cocaine 
                                                 
121 REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY MANUAL, supra note 118, at 7; see Levy–
Pounds, supra note 119 (“Although African Americans comprise just thirteen 
percent of the U.S. population, they constitute nearly forty percent of the federal 
and state prison population, largely due to drug–related convictions.”). 
122 Cox, supra note 79, at 18. 
123 Id. 
124 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2004). 
125 Marlow Stern, The House I Live In: A fascinating expose on the (racist) war 
on drugs, SUNDANCE CHANNEL BLOG (Jan. 27, 2012, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.sundancechannel.com/blog/2012/01/the-house-i-live-in (quoting the 
films creator in an interview).  “[W]hether it was racist in intent or not, it became 
de facto racist when congress was aware of how disproportionately these laws were 
putting African–Americans away in jail when other people using the same 
substance under different conditions were not.”  Id. 
126 1991 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 50, at 12 (explaining that the 
congressional goal of applying uniformity to sentencing is, “so that similar 
defendants convicted of similar offenses would receive similar sentences.”). 
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have created racially unbalanced results that have disproportionately 
imprisoned the African–American community.127  “Most experts128 
agree that there is no sound basis for the one hundred–to–one ratio 
between crack and cocaine, yet the difference and its lopsided effect 
remain; over eighty–eight percent of those arrested for possession of 
crack are African–American.”129  This overrepresentation of African-
–Americans may be due in part to the fact that law enforcement 
                                                 
127 Robert L. Carter, Fourth Annual W. Haywood Burns Memorial Lecture, 3 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 267, 272 (2000). 
Crack, a form of cocaine, has long been associated with poor black communities.  
The association persists despite the Sentencing Commission's widely publicized 
1995 Special Report to Congress on cocaine and federal sentencing, which 
established that fifty–two percent of crack users are white, and only thirty–eight 
percent are black.  This association between blacks and crack has proved a self–
fulfilling prophecy.  The Sentencing Commission's 1997 update report on cocaine 
and federal sentencing policy shows that, despite being a minority of crack users, 
ninety percent of persons convicted of crack offenses are black. 
Id. 
128 See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is It Time To Crack The 110 
To 1 Disparity?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Unfairness In Federal 
Cocaine Sentencing] (quoting several federal judges statements concerning the 
disparity in crack and powder cocaine penalties); Mary Jayne McKay, More Than 
They Deserve: Judges Protest Mandatory Sentencing In Drug Cases, CBS NEWS 
(May 7, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-590900.html 
(reporting that “federal judges by the dozens have protested harsh drug laws.”).  
Judges find that the mandatory minimum laws are unjust because they obligate 
them to either send people to prison who don’t belong there, or send people to 
prison for a longer periods than they deserve.  McKay, supra.  During the cocaine 
sentencing hearing in 2009, Honorable Robert C. “Bobby” Scott made a statement 
that the “disparity in crack and powder cocaine penalties makes no sense, is unfair 
and . . . [un]justified, and . . . should be fixed.”  Unfairness In Federal Cocaine 
Sentencing, supra.  He also noted that, after an extensive twenty year study 
between powder and crack cocaine, “there appears to be no convincing scientific, 
medical or public policy rationale to justify the current or any other disparity in 
penalties for the two forms of cocaine.”  Id.  Additionally, Honorable Roscoe G. 
Bartlett provided testimony that, “the [one–hundred–to–one] unequal treatment is 
not justified.”  Id. at 12. 
129 Mascharka, supra note 15, at 944; see THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2 
(explaining ninety percent of crack defendants in the federal system are African–
American). 
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efforts, including police emphasis on outdoor drug markets, are often 
geared toward sale and distribution offenses in low–income, urban, 
minority neighborhoods.130   
 
B. What Exceptions? The Safety Valve and Substantial 
Assistance Provisions Fail Underprivileged African–
Americans 
 
Congress recognized that the mandatory minimums were 
unjustly sentencing low–level offenders too harshly, and not 
applying to whom they were actually intended (the kingpins and 
mid–level offenders), and thus created the safety valve provision.131  
Although the safety valve provision is a step in the right direction to 
“restore . . . fairness and rationality to sentencing,” the provision falls 
short of this objective because its benefits apply too narrowly and its 
limiting factors result in arbitrary disqualification and increased 
racial disparity among African–Americans.132  Furthermore, another 
disconcerting aspect that undermines the effectiveness of the safety 
valve provision, and potentially contributes to racial disparity, is “the 
prosecution’s unbridled charging discretion [that] enables the 
government to include charges that will disqualify otherwise eligible 
offenders.”133 
                                                 
130 See Fellner, supra note 16, at 261–265; Kevin F. Ryan, Clinging to Failure: 
The Rise and Continued Life of U.S. Drug Policy, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 221, 226 
(1998) (stating that law enforcements attention to the drug trade is concentrated on 
inner–city, minority neighborhoods).  See generally THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra 
note 2 (noting that police departments are allowed to keep and operate off of the 
drug money and paraphernalia that they seize).  Unsurprisingly, law enforcements 
attention on these types neighborhoods yields vastly more minority arrests than 
Caucasians arrests, and fosters public perceptions that the drug business is 
predominantly a minority one.  Ryan, supra. 
131 Froyd, supra note 109, at 1498. 
132 See Reimer & Wayne, supra note 95, at 174.  In order to be eligible for the 
safety valve, a person cannot have more than one criminal history point, 
irrespective of how minor or remote in time the previous offense was.  Id.  This 
limiting factor contributes to increased racial disparity and arbitrary 
disqualification of otherwise qualified, low–level offenders.  Id. 
133 Id. at 175–76. 
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However, one of the most harrowing and pervasive injustices 
inflicted upon the underprivileged African–American community 
occurs when an offender facing a harsh mandatory sentence is too 
low–level to be able to furnish substantial assistance, yet is willing 
to work for the government to provide it.134  In this scenario, the 
offender becomes a confidential informant and “is turned back in the 
community with the specific goal of luring others into committing 
crimes,” creating yet another paradox in mandatory minimums 
objective efforts to deter criminal drug activity.135  This type of 
“ensnaring” provides substantially more unjust and complex 
socioeconomic concerns, particularly when taking place in inner–city 
communities with scarce resources, and few support mechanisms.136  
Furthermore, this aspect of the substantial assistance exception is yet 
another mechanism contributing to the degradation of the African–
American family.137  In the government’s sanctimonious pursuit of 
its never–ending drug war, the desire for arrests has overshadowed 
the respect for fundamental familial relationships; now,  government 
officers have been known to request that informants turn against their 
own siblings or spouses and, in some cases, even have children turn 
against their parents.138 
 
IV. The Negative Ripple Effect: Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences Collateral Impact on the Underprivileged 
African–American Family 
 
Harvard University Professor Charles J. Ogletree notes that 
there is a structural problem in America.139  He explains that there 
are two million people in jail or prison, one million of them African–
American and most of them males, many of who are incarcerated for 
non–violent drug offenses.140  This pattern, he explains, has 
                                                 
134 Id. at 174. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.; THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2. 
137 Reimer & Wayne, supra note 95, at 174. 
138 See id. 
139 See THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2. 
140 See id. 
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overwhelmed the African–American community, because there is 
now an entire generation of children who believe that they are going 
to be a part of the criminal justice system.141  Mandatory minimums 
calculate sentences based on the quantity of the drug involved, but 
they fail to calculate the tremendous socioeconomic costs associated 
with incarcerating low income African–American men and women 
for peripheral, non–violent drug offenses.142 
Moreover, mandatory minimum sentences break families 
apart,143 sometimes sending mothers and fathers away for very long 
                                                 
141 Id.  See generally Phillip Mlynar, The Top 5 Modern Rapping Drug Dealers, 
SF WEEKLY BLOGS (Aug. 30, 2011, 8:37 AM), 
http://blogs.sfweekly.com/shookdown/2011/08/the_top_5_modern_rapping_drug
.php?page=2 (listing the top five modern day rappers who rapped about their 
crimes and glorified going to jail).  The glorification of the “gangster” life by these 
entertainment figures has exploited the “flashy side of the drug game” and made 
trivial the concepts of prison life and its consequences.  Mlynar, supra.  These 
rappers celebrate their past criminal activities, and transform themselves from 
criminals into idolized and iconic ghetto heroes.  Id. 
142 See Nekima Levy–Pounds, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: How Poor 
Women of Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and 
Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 322–24 (2007) [hereinafter 
Levy–Pounds: From the Frying] (discussing the tremendous societal and economic 
costs associated with mandatory minimum sentences and the incarceration of 
mothers for peripheral involvement in drug trafficking).  The author explains that 
when mothers are incarcerated, a domino effect of harmful events occur, which 
ultimately weaken and destroy the family unit.  Id.  The impact of this domino 
effect is that: 
First, a mother's incarceration causes a disruption in the parent–child relationship . 
. . result[ing] in emotional harm to the child.  Second, because these families are 
disproportionately poor, single–parent households, it is probable that the children 
will be placed in the foster care system . . . result[ing] in additional emotional, 
psychological and physical harm to the children.  Third, children may not be able 
to maintain contact with their incarcerated mothers due to financial barriers, 
transportation restrictions, and capricious inmate relocation practices.  Fourth, 
because of emotional and psychological issues stemming from maternal 
separation, the children are prime candidates for involvement in the juvenile justice 
system . . . . 
Id. 
143 Id. at 317–24 (noting that incarceration itself is not the only barrier separating 
families).  Due to federal inmate relocation practices, inmates are often relocated 
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periods of time, leaving a ripple effect on the individual members of 
the community left behind.144  For example, for every African–
American father that is incarcerated, several other people are directly 
impacted, although the most severely effected are the children and 
their mothers.145  Due to the long periods of incarceration associated 
with mandatory minimums, that mother now needs to raise her 
children on her own, while also simultaneously being the sole 
                                                 
to different federal correctional facilities throughout various parts of the country.  
Id. at 317.  Because of financial difficulties or transportation constraints, federal 
inmate relocation practices often make it difficult, if not impossible for parents and 
children to remain in physical contact with one another.  Id. at 323. 
144 See Levy–Pounds, supra note 119, at 355; Cox, supra note 79, at 26 
(explaining how incarceration has a ripple effect on the African–American 
community); Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral 
Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 299, 305–22 (2005) (explaining the types of collateral 
consequences stemming from incarceration).  When poor African–American 
mothers and fathers are incarcerated, their innocent children left behind are equally 
punished.  Levy–Pounds, supra.  These children suffer a multitude of harms, 
including: 
They are more likely to become incarcerated themselves or become engaged in 
harmful activities such as gang involvement or substance abuse.   These children 
then become entrapped in a debilitating cycle of failure and marginalization that 
may be perpetuated from generation to generation . . . [additionally] [b]ecause of 
their low economic status, their extended families may have limited resources to 
provide care for them, which may result in their being placed in what are 
sometimes broken foster care systems. 
Id. 
145 See Mandatory Minimums Hurt Families, Children and Communities, NEW 
SOLUTIONS CAMPAIGN, available at 
http://www.drugpolicyaction.org/sites/default/files/DPAnj_mandatory.pdf 
[hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUMS HURT FAMILIES] (explaining the correlation 
between having a father in prison and its statistical impact on the likelihood of that 
child spending time in prison).  More than a million African–American children 
have a father in prison.  Statistically, children with a parent in prison are seven 
times more likely to spend time in prison themselves than children without a parent 
in prison.  Id. 
114 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 36.1 
financial provider; consequently, those children will now be more 
susceptible to become part of the criminal justice system.146 
In addition to leaving a devastating impact mandatory 
minimums impose on the family members left behind, mandatory 
minimums also have harmful effects on an individual once released 
from prison.147  Incarceration for drug offenses, no matter how 
peripheral or nominal the involvement, results in a prison record that 
brandishes a permanent scarlet “F” for felony conviction.148  This 
felony conviction harms the prospect of African–American social, 
economic, and familial prosperity.149  Research has shown that men 
with prison records are estimated to earn thirty to forty percent less 
annually than men without prison records, and that individuals with 
                                                 
146 THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2.  Today, 2.7 million children in America 
have a parent that is incarcerated.  These children are more likely to be incarcerated 
during their lifetime than other children.  Id. 
147 Alexander, supra note 22, at 22 (providing some examples of the rules, laws, 
and policies that apply to people branded felons today); Cox, supra note 79, at 29 
(explaining the negative effect of incarceration on released convicted felons); 
Levy–Pounds: From the Frying, supra note 142, at 338 (noting that convicted 
rapists, child molesters, and murderers may have access to federal financial aid, 
but convicted drug offenders do not); MANDATORY MINIMUMS HURT FAMILIES, 
supra note 145.  Once released from prison and brandished a felon, people face 
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, exclusion from jury services, 
and exceptional fees and fines that are almost impossible to comply with.  
Alexander, supra.  Federal law also renders drug offenders ineligible for food 
stamps for the rest of their lives, denying them access to public benefits, and some 
states even deny felons the right to vote.  Id. 
148 Alexander, supra note 22, at 20 (proclaiming that “felony” is the “new N–
word”).  Alexander explains that once an African–American has a felony stamp, 
their hope of employment, or any kind of integration into society, begins to fade 
out.  She associates incarceration and felony convictions as the modern day notion 
of lynching and racial control.  Id. 
149 THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra note 2; MANDATORY MINIMUMS HURT FAMILIES, 
supra note 145.  “Most people don’t realize that when you arrest a young black 
man, and he’s convicted and goes to prison, the first thing that happens to him 
when he gets out of prison is that he can’t get a job in most places because of his 
record.”  THE HOUSE I LIVE IN, supra.  Additionally, people with records are 
ineligible for certain school grants, cannot get certain healthcare benefits, are 
restricted from living in certain neighborhoods, and cannot vote.  Id. 
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prison records experience more unemployment and are more likely 
to have unstable family lives.150 
Mandatory minimum drug sentences bind the hands of judges 
to impose overly long and harsh sentences that are counter–
productive to their efforts, and counter–productive to fair notions of 
equality and justice.151  Instead of applying to high and mid–level 
drug offenders, mandatory minimums over-incarcerate low–level, 
low–income, and non–violent African–Americans at an alarmingly 
excessive rate.152  Furthermore, instead of decreasing drug use or 
crimes, mandatory minimums merely “increase the chances that 
families will be torn apart,” and merely subject vulnerable children 
to the same cyclical cycle of excessive incarceration.153 
 
V. Proposed Solutions 
 
While mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws may have 
initially been motivated by commendable objectives aimed at 
thwarting drug crimes, the fact of the matter is that the collateral 
consequences of their enforcement sweep too broadly and have a 
disparately racial impact on African–American communities and 
their families.154 The harsh and disproportionately negative 
consequences that these mandatory minimum laws impose on 
underprivileged African–Americans extensively outweigh any 
positive benefits they might have conceivably generated.155  
Accordingly, if Congress is to eradicate the continuous cycle of 
                                                 
150 MANDATORY MINIMUMS HURT FAMILIES, supra note 145. 
151 Id.; Finzen, supra note 144, at 321 (discussing the difficulties ex–offenders 
have when reintegrating into society); Tonry, supra note 21 at 102–03 (noting that 
mandatory minimum drug sentences are counter–productive because of the black 
market niche created by the illegal drug trade). 
152 See Froyd, supra note 109, at 1471. 
153 MANDATORY MINIMUMS HURT FAMILIES, supra note 145 (“Keeping families 
together and increasing the chances of success for vulnerable children and families 
is critically important, but mandatory minimum sentences tie the hands of judges 
and corrections professionals and increase the chances that families will be torn 
apart and children put at risk.”). 
154 Finzen, supra note 144, at 322. 
155 See id. 
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African–American poverty, disparate incarceration, and reoffending 
that its current drug sentencing policies helped to create, Congress 
must, first and foremost, restore judicial discretion and repeal 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and, second, offer community–
based alternatives to incarceration.156 
 
A. Drug Court Treatment Programs, a Community–Based 
Alternative to Incarceration 
 
Instead of charging low–level, non–violent drug offenders at 
the federal level, and subjecting them to lengthy prison sentences and 
unpredictable federal relocation practices, the states should assume 
disciplinary responsibility for these offenders and offer more 
individualized and appropriate alternatives to incarceration.157  
“[S]tates would arguably be in the best position to provide 
appropriate services to drug offenders, including access to drug 
treatment programs, crisis management services, public benefits and 
oversight of familial reunification and prisoner reentry efforts.”158  
Extensive scientific research over the past twenty years has indicated 
that drug court treatment programs are more effective than jail, 
prison, probation, or treatment alone.159  Drug courts work by closely 
supervising participants for a minimum one year term, during which 
the courts provide participants with intensive treatment to get clean 
and stay sober, subject participants to random and frequent drug tests, 
and require participants to regularly appear in court so that the 
presiding drug court judge can review the participants’ progress and 
make sure they are complying with all of their obligations.160  Drug 
court treatment programs are the most effective solutions for 
                                                 
156 Levy–Pounds: From the Frying, supra note 142, at 337. 
157 See id. at 342. 
158 Id. 
159 Drug Court Facts, supra note 18. 
160 What Are Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) 
[hereinafter What Are Drug Courts]. 
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reducing drug use,161 crime,162 combating addiction,163 restoring 
families,164 and saving taxpayers money.165  Furthermore, by 
implementing drug courts and making drug court treatment programs 
more available to low–level, non–violent drug offenders, States 
would ameliorate the harsh impacts that incarceration imposes on the 
African–American community, and, thereby,  help to keep families 
together.166 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
During the course of America’s forty year war against drugs, 
the Nation has dedicated a tremendous amount of fiscal resources 
“devoted to interdiction, apprehension, and imprisonment and far too 
little to prevention and meaningful treatment.”167  This has proved to 
be an ineffective method, because it has failed to address “deep–
seated social and economic deficits” in poor, urban communities.168  
Essentially, where there is a demand, economic opportunity will 
                                                 
161 Drug Court Facts, supra note 18 (explaining that drug courts provide more 
comprehensive supervision than other community–based programs, and are six 
times more likely to keep offenders in treatment long enough for them to get 
better). 
162 See id.  (noting that most rigorous studies have all concluded that drug courts 
significantly reduce crime as much as forty–five percent more than any other 
sentencing options). 
163 See id.  (finding that drug courts, when compared to eight other treatment 
programs, quadrupled the length of abstinence from methamphetamine). 
164 See id.  (finding that children of family drug court participants spend 
significantly less time in foster care, and that family re–unification rates are fifty 
percent higher for family drug court participants). 
165 See id.  (“Drug Courts produce cost savings ranging from $3,000 to $13,000 
per client.”). 
166 Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1301–02 (1998). 
167 Dan Richard Beto, The War on Drugs: A Failure, 58–SEP FED. PROBATION 68 
(1994). 
168 Id.; Tonry, supra note 21, at 102.  “Despite risks of arrest, imprisonment, 
injury, and death, drug trafficking offers economic and other rewards to 
disadvantaged people that appear to far outweigh any available in the legitimate 
economy.”  Tonry, supra. 
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always ensue, and thus a supply will continually follow.169  
Therefore, reductions in drug abuse, trafficking, and crime, will only 
stem from an impossible reduction in the demand for those drugs 
themselves, consequently rendering America the perpetual loser in 
its war against drugs.170  The real victims of this war, however, are 
the disadvantaged members of the African–American community, 
who continue to be the chief target of the drug war’s harshest 
weapon—mandatory minimum sentences.171  Alas, when mandatory 
minimum sentences are pervasively applied to low–level, non–
violent, drug offenders, the effects devastate an entire community, 
leaving fragmented neighborhoods and collapsing families in its 
wreckage.172 
 
                                                 
169 Tonry, supra note 21, at 102–03.  See generally Levy–Pounds, supra note 119, 
at 363 (explaining that while there undoubtedly needs to be accountability for drug 
crimes, there also needs to be an examination of the social root level causes of drug 
involvement).  The author explains that: 
This is not to suggest that persons involved in drug trafficking should not face 
accountability for their actions.  Rather it is to say that an examination of root level 
causes of drug involvement, coupled with analyses of the effects of chronic 
marginalization and under–employment on this segment of the population should 
have been a starting point for determining appropriate solutions to the problems 
caused by participation in the drug trade. 
Levy–Pounds, supra. 
170 See generally Larry E. Walker, Law and More Disorder! The Disparate Impact 
of Federal Mandatory Sentencing for Drug Related Offenses on the Black 
Community, 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 97, 119 (1995) (explaining the contradiction 
that arises between the drugs wars designed intent to decrease street violence and 
actual effect).  “The greatest percentage of arrests, prosecutions, and sentencing 
are for drug offenses in which no violent crime is involved.”  Id. 
171 Id. at 97. 
172 Nunn, supra note 22, at 383–84 (explaining the harmful social consequences 
of incarcerating such a large number of African–American males); Levy–Pounds, 
supra note 119, at 363–75 (explaining the implications of the drug war and its 
effects on African–American men, women, and children). 
